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Article 6

No Easy Solutions to the Problem of Criminal
Mega-trials
I.

INTRODUCTION

The criminal mega-trial emerged in the late 1980s.' These
trials, characterized by multiple defendants and multiple Charges,
can sometimes last more than a year and can consume many
thousands of' pages of trial transcript.2 Criminal mega-trials have
come under attack recently, forcing some courts to adopt remedies. These remedies, though superficially attractive, are not always within the court's authority to adopt.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recently encountered a criminal mega-trial in the so-called "Pizza
Connection Case," United States v. Casamento. Casamento lasted,

1 PROPOSAL OF THE FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON SECOND CIRCUIT
COURTS CONCERNING PROBLEMS CREATED BY EXTREMELY LONG CRIMINAL TRIALS, 128
F.R.D. 137 (1989) [hereinafter Bar Council Committee] The Bar Council Committee observed:
The past five years have seen a new development in federal criminal trial practice, the dramatic proliferation of the very long criminal trial. Now, as never
before, trial judges in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and in
several other busy federal districts, are regularly presiding over trials of a length
of four months or more.
Id. at 137.
Additionally, commentators have expressed concern that criminal litigation under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is becoming increasingly
complex. "Along with the amazing successes [of RICO]. ... have come some concerns
that are beginning to receive wide attention - not the least of which are connected to
the rise of the federal RICO 'megatrial.'" 10 NAT'L L.J. Feb. 22, 1988, at 12, col. 1.
Nonetheless, such concerns may be exaggerated. The chief of the Organized Crime
Strike Force in the Southern District of New York stated that "of the 400 Criminal
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cases brought nationwide since
1970, only six lasted more than six months." 11 NAT'L UJ. Oct. 3, 1988, at 13, col. 3.
2 For example, the Bar Council Committee noted:
During the five years 1983-87, nine trials in the Southern, and Eastern Districts
have lasted longer than 65 trial days .... [E]ach of these trials lasted a minimum of approximately 16 weeks or about four months. Indeed, the average
length of these trials was 112 trial days (28 four-day weeks or approximately
seven months). The longest of them lasted 274 trial days (over 68 four-day
weeks or approximately 16 months). By contrast, over the preceding nine years
1974-82, only one criminal trial in the Southern and Eastern Districts lasted as
long as 65 trial days, and that trial lasted exactly 65 days.
Bar Council Committee, 128 F.R.D. at 137.
3 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990).
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more than seventeen months,4 produced over forty thousand pages of trial transcript,5 and "involved the introduction of thousands of exhibits and the testimony of more than 275 witnesses. " '
Casamento involved thirty-five indicted defendants charged
with conspiring to import and distribute narcotics in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846. 7 Twenty-one individuals originally indicted were
joined for trial. Ten counts charged individual defendants with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.' One defendant was
charged with causing false statements to be made to the Internal
Revenue Service or aiding and abetting the making of such statements, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001-02.' Various defendants were

4 Id at 1149.
5 I&
6 Id
7 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988), dealing with control and prevention of drug abuse, provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this
subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempted conspiracy."
8 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) prohibits engagement in a continuing criminal enterprise
(CCE). A person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter
the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter
or subchapter II of this chapter(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more
other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management,
and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
Id. § 848(c). Thus, as part of its case in Casamento, the prosecution attempted to prove
that the ten defendants charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 848 each organized or managed at least five other people in an agreement to commit a series of narcotics violations, where some violations were actually committed resulting in substantial income or
resources. Jeffers v. United States 432 U.S. 137, 148 (1977). To prove a CCE violation is
a formidable undertaking in itself. To prove ten such violations and various criminal
charges against these and eleven other defendants in one trial illustrates the complexity
of this particular criminal mega-trial.
9 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up
by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1002 (1988) provides:
Whoever, knowingly and with intent to defraud the United States, or any
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also charged with conspiring to transport money out of the United States without filing required currency reports, violating 18
U.S.C. § 371.10 Also,. the indictment charged fifteen defendants
with failing to file required currency reports or aiding such failure, violating 31 U.S.C. §§ 1059," 1081,12 and 5322(b)13 and
18 U.S.C. § 2."4 The indictment charged another ten defendants

agency thereof, possesses any false, altered, forged or counterfeited writing or
document for the purpose of enabling another to obtain from the United
States, or from any agency, officer or agent thereof, any sum of money, shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Id.
10

18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) provides:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
11
vides:

31 U.S.C. § 1059 (1982), which was recodified at 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1988), pro-

(a) A person willfully violating this subchapter [dealing with records and reports
on monetary instruments transactions] or any regulation prescribed under this
subchapter . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000, imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.
Id.
31 U.S.C. § 1081 was recodified at 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988) which provides:
(a) When a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction for the
payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency (or other monetary instruments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes), in an amount, denomination, or amount and denomination, or under circumstances the Secretary
prescribes by regulation, the institution and any other participant in the transaction the Secretary may prescribe shall file a report on the transaction at the
time and in the way the Secretary prescribes ....

12

Id.

13

31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (1988) provides:

(b) A person willfully violating this subchapter [relating to records and reports
on monetary instruments transactions] or a regulation 'prescribed under this
subchapter . . . while violating another law of the United States or as part of a
pattern of illegal activity involving transactions of more than $100,000 in a 12month period, shall be fined not more than $500,000, imprisoned for not more
than 5 years, or both.
Id.
14

18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) provides:

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, conmands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
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with failing to file required currency reports, violating 31 U.S.c.
§§ 1059's and 110116 and 18 U.S.C § 2.17 Finally, the indictment charged thirty-one defendants with conspiring to conduct
and participating, through a pattern of racketeering, in an enterprise engaged in international drug trafficking and related money
laundering, or aiding and abetting such a conspiracy in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)," and 18 U.S.C. § 2."9 The jury found
numerous defendants guilty on various charges, and fifteen defendants eventually appealed their convictions. 20 The jury acquitted
two defendants on the continuing criminal enterprise
charge, and
21
one defendant on the narcotics conspiracy charge.
The appellants in Casamento argued that "the length and complexity of the trial prevented the jury from adequately remembering and evaluating the evidence."2 2 Based on the "verdicts that

by him or another would be an offense against the United States is punishable.
as a principal.
Id.
15
16

31 U.S.C. § 1059 (1982). See supra note 11.
31 U.S.C. § 1101 was recodified at 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1988) which provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person or an agent or
bailee of the person shall file a report under subsection (b) of this section
when the person, agent, or bailee knowingly(1) transports or has transported monetary instruments of more than
$5,000 at one time(A) from a place in the United States to or through a place
outside the United States; or
(B) to a place in the United States from or through a place
outside the United States; or
(2) receives monetary instruments of more than $5,000 at one tifiie
transported into the United States from or through a place outside the
United States.
(b) A report under this section shall be filed at the time and place the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes.

lId
17 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See supra note 14.
18 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) prohibits any person from conspiring to receive income from a racketeering activity or from investing in any enterprise that is engaged in
racketeering activities, or from conspiring to acquire, through a pattern of racketeering,
any interest in activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce, or from conspiring to
conduct, by a pattern of racketeering, the affairs of an enterprise which affects interstate
or foreign commerce.
19 See supra note 14. The above facts were summarized from United States v.
Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1989).
20 Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir. 1989).
21 See appendix to Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1191-95.
22 Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1149. The appellants argued that "because the jury could
not remember the evidence sufficiently, it had to rely uncritically on the government's
summary charts." Id. The appellants also argued that because the jury was "unable to
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the jury rendered, and.., on the apparently careful way in
which the jury evaluated the evidence,"" the court concluded
24 a rethat the defendants did not "suffer substantial prejudice,"
25
quirement to overturn a denial of a motion for severance.
Part I of this Note discusses the problems with the criminal
mega-trial. Part II presents a remedy proposed by the Second
Circuit in Casamento. Part III discusses the law of joinder and the
public polices behind joinder of defendants and offenses. Part IV
argues that the Second Circuit's proposed remedy is invalid because it violates public policy, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the doctrine of separation of powers.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CRIMINAL MEGA-TRIALS
The court in United States v. Gallo6' outlined the mega-trial
crisis in the criminal justice system. In Gallo, a twenty-two count
indictment named sixteen defendants. The indictment charged
thirteen defendants with conspiring with each other and with
several unindicted co-conspirators "to participate in the affairs of
a racketeering enterprise. "27 The indictment also charged fourteen defendants with "various 'substantive' offenses, all relating
to the affairs of the alleged enterprise."28
The court stated that these "monster trials"29 burden the
court, the defendants and the jury. According to the court, the
defendants lose their rights to counsel because many attorneys

evaluate the evidence independently, severance was required, and that the district court's
refusal to sever the trial, as requested, deprived them of due process." Id.
23 1d. at 1151. The court discussed one particular fact which illustrated the jury's
ability to evaluate the evidence.
During its deliberations, the jury, in a note to the judge, requested "testimony
and surveillance reports, if any, of July 24, 1983 surveillance." . . . . After receiving the jury's note, the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that no surveillance relating to [one particular defendant's] activities on July 24, 1983 existed . . . . The jury's ability to discover that no evidence supported this particular
racketeering act, when 128 such acts were charged in the indictment, is telling
support for the conclusion that the jury scrutinized the evidence with great
care.

Id.
24
25
26
S. Ct.
27
28
29

Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1149. ,
668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aflrd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109
1539 (1988).
Id. at 738.

Id.
Id. at 754.
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cannot commit the time required for a multi-defendant, multicharge case,"0 and thus, will not take the case. The defendants
are also faced with the increased possibility of having to seek
alternative counsel during the course of the trial because the time
commitment has become too burdensome for the defendant's retained counsel."' The court also noted the tremendous legal fees
incurred by defendants in cases where a trial runs several
months.3 2 Finally, with respect to defendants, the court recognized that a complex criminal trial disrupts defendants' home
lives and careers due to both the trial itself and the pretrial incarceration.33
A mega-trial also burdens the court. As the court in Gallo
noted, "trial judges in these multi-defendant endless cases are
confronted by a 'great problem . . . of trial management."'' 4 For
example, the judge must "make numerous decisions on admissibility of evidence, and must fashion admonitions to the jury regarding the proper limited consideration to be accorded much of the
proof ....
The court is also faced with numerous problems of
scheduling and administration."" The Gallo court also pointed
out the effect that a mega-trial has on the court calendar where
the case is to be heard. "If the court does decide to try the case
as a whole, the judge must adjourn the remainder of his or her
civil and criminal calendars for an indefinite and protracted period of time ..

s"36
The court concluded that the "overburdened

docket of the court reaches a breaking point and the administration of justice in all of the court's cases is unconscionably delayed."3 7
Finally, the court discussed the hardships on the jurors selected to serve on criminal mega-trials:
They [the jurors] are removed from their normal lives for
inordinate stretches of time, and are subjected to an alien and
often confusing system. They must sit stoically and silently for
hours everyday, day after day. They must absorb vast quantities
of information, try to keep it in order, and evaluate its cred-

30 Id.
31 Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 786, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), af'd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1539 (1988).

32 Id.
33
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 840 (2d. Cir. 1962)).
Id.
Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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ibility and probative value. They must also perform the "mental gymastic" .. . of properly considering the various permutations of the many limiting instructions they are given. The
process as a whole is undoubtedly draining, disorienting, and
often demoralizing.'
Another consideration, which the Gallo court found even
more significant than the above concerns, was that the severance
of trials might cause some defendants to plea bargain, reducing
the trial time consumed by a particular case. The court stated:
[T]here is a significant possibility that certain severed defendants may plead guilty after they have seen the government's
method and quality of proof in preceding trials. The imminence of their verdict will no doubt sharpen their judgment.
The proof against them is crystallized in preparation for their
trials, and thus a strong government case is more easily recog39

nized.

The Gallo court found that severance of defendants and offenses
saved time. "At the very least, it is safe to say that the severed
case remedies the delay in trial that. is inevitably necessitated for
some defendants by a joint proceeding, because the court does not
have to wait until all the parties and their counsel are available."" ° Also, severed trials are particularly efficient when the issues involved do not substantially overlap. The Gallo court wrote:'
The trial is much smoother and more concise. The evidence in

38 Id. Nonetheless, the court's concerns over the burden a long trial places on
jurors may have been exaggerated. Recent statistics indicate that jurors fare better than
the court assumed. For example, in a study done comparing the attitudes of jurors
whose jury service lasted longer than they expected with those who served for a shorter
period than they anticipated, eighty-five percent of those who served as a juror on a
long case responded that they would be willing to serve on the case if they could do it
,over again. J.S. CECIL, E.A. LIND & G. BERMANTY, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL
TRIALS 23 (Federal Judicial Center 1987). In that same group, thirty-six percent responded that serving on a lengthy trial did not interfere with their normal life at all, while
only a few responded that the service very much interfered with their normal lives. Id.
Also, the study showed that jury service generally did not result in economic hardship
for the jurors. For example, "[m]ore than 90 percent of the employed jurors were paid
by their employers for the days they were absent because of jury service, and of these,
more than 90 percent received full pay for the time they missed." Id. at 24. Finally, "the
jurors responses to the question about their willingness to serve again were overwhelmAmong those jurors who said that the length of their service
ingly affirmative ....
greatly exceeded their expectations, 75 percent said they would be willing to repeat the
experience . . . ." Id. at 25.
39 GaUo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), af'd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1539 (1988).
40 Id. at 756 (emphasis in original).
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each case does not scatter about the various contours of the
conspiracy. There are one or two or three defense counsel
cross-examining and raising objections rather than one or two
dozen. Sidebars are much more infrequent. Continuances and
adjournments are less common."'
In short, the Gallo court concluded that it preferred severance to the complex mega-trial in multi-defendant, multi-offense
cases. In addition to inconveniencing the parties involved,4 2 the
mega-trial wastes time and resources. According to the court,
severance alleviates these problems.
III.

AN OUTLINE OF THE CASAMENTO SOLUTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the Casamento convictions despite the trial's length and
complexity. The court determined that the defendants did not
suffer improper prejudice because the jury was able to fairly evaluate the evidence.4" Nonetheless, the court had "misgivings
about trials of this magnitude."44 Because the court hoped that it
would not "soon again be presented with the transcript of a seventeen-month trial in which more than thirty persons were named
as defendants,"" the court issued benchmarks for district courts
confronted with possible severance in a criminal mega-trial.
The Casamento benchmarks are as follows:
1. The prosecutor must submit to the court an estimate of
the time required to present the government's case. Where the
estimate exceeds four months, the prosecutor must reasonably
support a decision to try the defendants jointly rather than separately. The court should then determine whether the prosecutor's
basis is adequate by weighing the interests of the parties, court,
jurors, and society.4"
2. In considering severance, the court "should explore with
the prosecutor "4 7 whether to limit the prosecution to easily proven offenses that would "carry exposure to adequate maximum
penalties."4"

41 Id. at 757.
42 Id.
43 United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
CL 1138 (1990).
44 Id. at 1151.
45 Id. at 1153.
46 Id. at 1151.
47 Id. at 1152.
48 Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1152 (2d Cir. 1989), ceit. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138
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3. The prosecutor must "make an especially compelling justification"" for a .trial of more than ten defendants that the prosecutor estimates would take more than four months."
The response to the Casamento guidelines has yet to be completely determined. Nonetheless, the Criminal Law Reporters'
hailed the court's decision as announcing new "guidelines for
federal trial courts to follow in deciding whether to permit trials
to reach 'mega-trial' proportions through joinder of multiple
defendants." 2
One district court in the Second Circuit interpreted the
benchmarks as binding instructions. In United States v. Gambino,5
the court severed twelve defendants into two groups based on the
Casamento guidelines. According to the Gambino court, since the
prosecutor estimated that a trial of all twelve defendants would
take six months, "[u]nder Casamento, the burden is clearly on the

(i990).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1151-52. These guidelines have been summarized. The court's opinion provided as follows:
First, the district judge should elicit from the prosecutor a good faith estimate
of the time reasonably anticipated to present the government's case . . . . In
those cases where the judge determines that the time for presentation of the
prosecutor's case will exceed four months, the judge should oblige the prosecutor to present a reasoned basis to support a conclusion that a joint trial of all
the defendants is more consistent with the fair administration of justice than
some manageable division of the case into separate trials . . . . iT]he judge
should weigh the interests of the prosecution, the defendants, the jurors, the
court, and the public . ' . . The judge should give particular attention to the
feasibility of conducting separate trials for any one or more defendants as to
whom a separate trial would be relatively brief, especially if such defendants are
willing to stipulate, for purposes of a separate trial, to facts concerning the
activities of other defendants who remain to be tried in the main trial.
In considering the advisability of separate brief trials for one or more defendants, the judge should explore with the prosecutor whether the interests of
justice would be adequately served by limiting the prosecution of such defendants to charges that can be proven expeditiously and that, in the event of conviction, carry exposure to adequate maximum penalties.
Finally, in assessing the appropriate number of defendants for any trial in
which the prosecutor's case is likely to require more than four months to present, the judge should oblige the prosecutor to make an especially compelling
justification for a joint trial of more than ten defendants.
Id.
51 CA 2 Sets Guidelinesfor 'Mega-Trials', 46 CRIM. L REPTR. 6 (1989). See also 202
N.Y.LJ. 1 (1989) (Casamento "set up guidelines for trial judges to decide if defendants in
megatrials - which extend over months and sometimes years should be tried separately
or in groups").
52 Id.
53 729 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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government to show 'an especially compelling justification for a
joint trial. ' " " The court found that the prosecution did not meet
its burden and thus severed twelve defendants into a group of
five defendants and a group of seven defendants. 5 In short, the
Gambino court considered the Casamento guidelines as binding
instructions and not as guidelines provided through dicta.5"
IV.

THE LAW AND POLICIES BEHIND JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS
AND OFFENSES

A.

The Law ofJoinder

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 permits the joinder of
criminal defendants and offenses. Rule 8(a) states that litigants
may join offenses where the crimes are similar in character, or
arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions connected together or forming part of a common scheme.57 The
rule for joinder of defendants is similar. Rule 8(b) states that
defendants may be charged together if they allegedly participated
in the same act or same series of acts.5 8

54 Id. at 970.
55 Id. at 971.
56 See also United States v. Carrozza, 728 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), where the
district court interpreted the guidelines not as suggestions but as the rules to be followed in applicable cases. The Carozza court, however, determined that the facts before
them were distinguishable from those in Casamento, and thus the court was not bound
by the Casamento guidelines. The court stated: "In this case, we are only dealing with
two defendants being joined in a trial that will last for substantially less than four
months. Therefore, we do not find ourselves bound to enter into the detailed inquiry
articulated by the Second Circuit" in Casamento. Id. at 273 n.8. Thus, the court interpreted the Casamento guidelines as binding, but not in the case before them because the
trial did not rise to the mega-trial level that the Casamento court considered.
57 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan.
FED. R. GRIM. P. 8(a) (emphasis in original).
58 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act
or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each
count.
FED. R. GRIM. P. 8(b) (emphasis in original).
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Once a court determines that defendants or offenses may be
joined under Rule 8, the court must do a secondary analysis under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. Rule 14 states that
defendants or offenses may be severed if joinder would result in
prejudice to a defendant. 9 The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules explained that the "purpose of the amendment is to
provide a procedure whereby the issue, of possible prejudice can
be resolved on the motion for severance. The judge may direct
the disclosure of confessions or statements of the defendants ...
as an aid to determining whether the possible prejudice justifies
ordering separate trials.""0
Case law indicates that the trial judge has complete discretion
in considering severance under Rule 14. The United States Supreme Court, in Opper v. United States,"' considered Rule 14 and
stated that "[i]t is within the sound discretion of the trial judge as
to whether the defendants should be tried together or several-

Several courts have interpreted .the language of Rule 8. For example, in United
States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979),
the Fourth Circuit stated that "[w]here the defendant's acts are part of a series of acts
or transactions, it is not necessary that each defendant be charged in each count, nor to
show that each defendant participated in every act or transaction in the series" in order
to be tried together. Also, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d
540, 543 (4th Cir. 1981), held that the "fact that each incident of participation may not
have constituted a crime on the part of a defendant is of no consequence. 'Participation'
in the same series of transactions as referred to in Rule 8(b) does not require
'participation' in each transaction of the series."
Finally, the United States Supreme Court, in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,
270 U.S. 593 (1920), stated that the term "transaction" has no set meaning.
"'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon
their logical relationship." Id. at 610. Although the Moore definition applied to a context
other than that of Rule 8(b), the court in United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 761 (5th
Cir. 1976), adopted the Moore definition of "transaction" in a Rule 8(b) context. Thus,
the language of Rule 8(b) is given its ordinary, flexible meaning.
59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. The rule provides:
Relieffrom PrejudkialJoinder. If it appears that a defendant or the government is
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or an
information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election of separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide
whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for
severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to
the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the
defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
Id.
60
61

FED. R. CPIM. P. 14 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment).
348 U.S. 84 (1954).
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,62 Also, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Chang An-

Lo,6"

stated that "[m]otions to sever under Rule 14 are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and a denial of
such motion will be reversed only upon a showing of clear abuse
of that determination."

64

More recently, courts have ruled that a trial judge may exercise discretion in determining whether prejudice would occur.
Upon such a finding, the court must sever the defendants or
6 5 stated
offenses. For example, the court in United States v. Ford
that "severance is permissible under Rule 14 only if the defendant
shows that the joinder prejudiced his defense."6" Also, the court
in United States v. Burke6 7 wrote that the "judge is empowered
under Fed. R. Grim. P. 14 to sever the trials of criminal defendants if he determines that the parties will be unduly prejudiced
by ajoint prosecution.
To overturn a severance motion denial, the standard is still
higher. For example, in United States v. Gorecki,69 the Third Circuit stated that a "claim of improper joinder under F. R. Crim. P.
14 must demonstrate 'clear and substantial prejudice.'" 70 Also,
the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Dorsey,7 ' stated that to
"demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the defendant must establish
that the joint trial subjected him not just to some prejudice but
to compelling prejudice against which the district court could not

62 Id. at 95.
63 851 F.2d 547 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 966 (1988).
64 Id. at 556. See also United States v. Neal, 692 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982). The
Neal court stated that "[i]t is well settled that the grant or denial of a severance under
Rule 14 F.R.Crim.P., lies within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . . For prejudice resulting from denial of a severance motion to justify reversal, the defendant must
show more than just a better chance of acquittal at separate trials." Id. at 1305.
65 632 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981).
66 Id. at 1373.
67 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983).
68 Id at 83.
69 813 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1987).
70 Id. at 43 (citing United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1017 (1988)). See also United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1427 (9th
Cir. 1987) (the "defendant must show a violation of one of his substantive rights such-as
denial of the sixth amendment right to confrontation in order to make a showing of

such manifest prejudice"); United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cr.
denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980) ("Rule 14 provides that, at the discretion of the trial judge,
a severance may be ordered when it appears that a defendant may be significantly

prejudiced by a joint trial with his codefendants .... He must also show violation of
one of his substantive rights by reason of the joint iial").

71

819 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1025 (1988).
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72
afford protection."

B. Policy FavorsJoint Trials
Contrary to the conclusions of the Casamento court, public
policy favors joint trials. As the Federal Bar Council Committee
on Second Circuit Courts Concerning Problems Created by Extremely Long Criminal Trials noted, the government favors joint
trials.73 The committee wrote:
The government's apparent preference for"lengthier joint trials
rather than shorter separate trials is often based on defensible
policies, such as the efficiency of one long trial, a desire to
present a full picture of a complex multidefendant criminal
scheme, an interest in limiting the number of appearances by
government witnesses who may be reluctant to testify at all or
whose appearances may present security problems, or a reluctance to allow the discovery that might be the side effect of
multiple trials.'
Also, the majority of circuit courts that have interpreted
Rules 8 and 14 have determined that public policy favors joint trials. 75 For example, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v.
DeLuna, 6 stated that "there is a strong policy in favor of joint
trials where the defendants are 'alleged to have participated in
the same act- or transactions constituting an offense or offenses."' 77 Judicial efficiency is the factor behind the favoring of joint
78
trials.

72 Id. at 1058.
73 See supra note 1 at 138.
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, '773 F.2d 1180 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Wirsing, 719 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.),
cemt. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); United States v. Scott, 659 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1981),

cei. denied, 459 U.S.
cert. denied, 450 U.S.
denied, 417 U.S. 976
cert. denied, 401 U.S.
76 763 F.2d 897

854 (1982); United States
934 (1981); United States
(1974); and United States
924 (1971).
(8th Cir. 1985).
77 Id. at 919 (quoting FED. R. CRiM. P. 8).

v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980),
v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert.
v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970),

See also United States v. Davis, 773 F.2d
1180, 1181 (11th Cir. 1985) (Rule 8 is "broadly construed in favor of initial joinder");
United States v. Scott, 659 F.2d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854
(1982) ("Rule 8 is to be broadly construed in favor of initial joinder").
78 See, e.g., United States v. Wirsing, 719 F.2d 859, 862 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[tlo the extent that it is consistent with providing the defendant with a fair trial, the Rule is to be
construed liberally to promote the goals of trial convenience and judicial efficiency");
United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cerm. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
The prerequisites for joinder of defendants under rule 8(b) should be liberally
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Finally, the United States Supreme Court's policy is to favor
joint trials over severed trials. The Court firmly articulated this
policy in Bruton v. United States.79 The Court wrote that "[j]oint
trials do conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses
and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing the accused
of crime to trial.""0 Courts must avoid the multiplicity of trials.
The Bruton Court stated that Rules 8 and 14 are "'designed to
promote economy and efficiency and to avoid a multiplicity of
trials, where these objectives can be achieved without substantial
prejudice to the right of the defendants to a fair trial.'"' Courts
favor joint trials particularly when the same evidence would be
used in both severed trials. 2

construed. A broad reading of rule 8(b) is justified because Fed. R.Crim.P. 14
provides a means by which trial courts can protect defendants from prejudice
resulting from joint trials . ...
Thus, in evaluating joinder under rule 8(b), the
trial court must balance its obligation to avoid prejudice that may result from
joining multiple defendants against a policy favoring maximum trial efficiency.
Id. at 655; United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1158 (7th Cir.), ceit. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974) ("Rule 8 is construed broadly to allow liberal joinder and thereby enhance
the efficiency of the judicial system"); and United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 899
(9th Cir. 1970), cen. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971) ("Rule 8(b)'s 'goal of maximum trial
convenience consistent with minimum prejudice' is best served by permitting initial joinder of charges against multiple defendants whenever the common activity constitutes a
substantial portion of the proof of the joined charges"). See also United States v. Davis,
773 F.2d 1180 (l1th Cir. 1985); United States v. Scott, 659 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1981),
cit. denied, 459 US. 854 (1982); and United States v. Ford 632 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981).
79 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, Bruton and Evans were convicted of armed
postal robbery after a joint trial. Evans had confessed to a postal inspector that he and
Bruton committed the armed robbery. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed Bruton's conviction "because the trial judge instructed the jury
that although Evan's confession was competent evidence against Evans it was inadmissible
hearsay against [Bruton] and therefore had to be disregarded in determining petitioner's
guilt or innocence." Id. at 125. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's holding
because of the "substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked
to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission
of Evans's confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 126.
80 Id. at 134.
81 Id. at 131. (quoting Daley v. United States, 231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 964 (1956)).
82 United States v. Ras, 713 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1983). The court determined that
the Seventh Circuit "has expressed a 'strong policy in favor of joint trials where the
charge against all the defendants may be proved by the same evidence and results from
the same series of acts.'" Id. at 315 (quoting United States v. McPartin, 595 F.2d 1321,
1333 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979)). See also United States v. Jackson, 549
F.2d 517, 523 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977) ("It is the general rule that
persons charged in a conspiracy should be tried together, particularly where proof of the
charges against the defendants is based upon the same evidence and acts"); and United
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The United States Supreme Court's most recent affirmation
of the policy favoring joint trials appeared in Richardson v.
Marsh."3 In Richardson, three defendants were charged with two
murders and an assault during an armed robbery. 4 The trial
court allowed one defendant's confession to be entered into evidence once references to the other defendants, one of whom was
the respondent in the case, were deleted. 5 Both the prosecutor
and the trial judge warned the jury against using the confession
against the other defendants.8 " Respondent appealed her conviction of "two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of an
armed robbery and.-one count of assault with intent to commit
murder" 7 on the grounds that the "joint trial had violated her
rights under the Confrontation Clause." 8 In his opinion reversing the Sixth Circuit and reinstating the convictions, Justice Scalia
wrote that "U]oint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice
system, accounting for almost one-third of federal criminal trials
in the past five years." 9 Justice Scalia further explained:
It would impair both the efficiency, and the fairness of the
criminal justice system to require, in all these cases of joint
crimes where incriminating statements exist, that prosecutors
bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again
and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly
favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of
knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts
and enabling more accurate assessment -of relative culpability-advantages which sometimes operate to the defendant's
benefit. Even apart from these tactical considerations joint
trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding the
scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.'

States v. Marquez, 686 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (N.D. 111.1988) ("where a charge against all
defendants may be proved by the same evidence and results from the same series of
acts, a joint trial of all defendants is strongly favored").
83 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
84 Ii. at 202.
85 Id. at 203.
86 Id. at 205. Nonetheless, in describing the incident, the prosecutor later linked the
respondent to the confession. Id.

87 Id.
88 Richardson, 481 U.S. 200, 205 (1987).
89 Id. at 209.
90 Id. at 210.
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THE CASAMENTO SOLUTION IS INCONSISTENT wrrH EXISTING
PoLIcIES AND RULES
A.

The Supreme Court's Policy

The benchmarks in Casamento appear to alleviate the problems posed by the criminal mega-trials. Nonetheless, these
benchmarks contradict longstanding policies of the Supreme
Court, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the separation of powers doctrine. As a result, the Casamento benchmarks
are not the cure for the problems created by criminal mega-trials.
1. Convenience of the System Prevails over Convenience of the
Court
In United States v. Bruton9 and Richardson v. Marsh92 the
Supreme Court definitively stated that public policy favors joint
trials." The Casamento approach blatantly disregards this longstanding policy. Instead of considering the efficiency of the entire
system, the Casamento court focused on its own inconvenience.9 4
Although considering such a case would necessarily be exhausting
for the circuit court to which it is appealed, the Casamento court
gave no consideration to the efficiency of the entire court system.
If the district court had severed the defendants and offenses in
Casamento, as many as thirty trials could have resulted, requiring
thirty judges, thirty courtrooms, thirty juries, and producing thousands of pages of trial transcript each. Also, a great number of
the two hundred and seventy-five witnesses would have had to
testify in many different trials. Finally, the thirty different judgments would be subject to thirty different appeals. With such a
tremendous result, of course, the district court would not have
severed each defendant and each offense. Nonetheless, each severance results in separate resources being consumed. The aggregate
effect of severance would easily tax the system more than a single
joint trial.

91 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
92 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
93 See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
94 After laying out its benchmarks, the court complained, "we offer the guidance
outlined in the preceding paragraphs in the hope that we will not soon again be presented with the transcript of a seventeen-month trial in which more than thirty persons
were named as defendants." United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1149, 1153 (2d Cir.
1989).
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Severance does not have a Domino-Effect

2.

Proponents of severing joint trials argue that guilty verdicts in
the early trials of several severed defendants and offenses would
lead to plea bargaining in the later trials. Such plea bargaining
would reduce actual trial time needed to dispense with the whole
case. The court in United States v. Gallo5 made this argument.
As noted above, the Gallo court wrote:
[T]here is a significant possibility that certain severed defendants may plead guilty after they have seen the government's
method and quality of proof in preceding trials. The imminence of their verdict will no doubt sharpen their judgment..
The proof against them is crystallized in preparation for their
trials, and thus a strong government case is more easily recognized.
In short, some courts have projected that severance of defendants
would lead to more plea bargaining and reduce the burden on
the courts.
(a) Sentencing Statute Changes Moot the Issue.-Although the
argument that severance leads to subsequent plea bargains may
have been valid in the early 1980s, a change in the sentencing law
undercuts it entirely with respect to narcotics violations such as
those in Casamento. Congress amended 21 U.S.C. § 841"s in
1988 to include mandatory minimum sentences for narcotics related offenses. Section 841(b)(1)(A) states that anyone convicted of
manufacturing, distributing, etc. one kilogram or more of heroin
or five kilograms or more of coca leaves or cocaine, or ecgonine
or any mixture of these "shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be' less than 10 years...."9

Section

95 668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
96 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988)'(as amended 1988) prohibits narcotics distribution. The
statute provides:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to dispense,
a counterfeit substance.
97

21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1989) (as amended 1988). The statute provides:

Except as otherwise provided in section 845, 945a, or 845b of this title, any
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841(b)(1)(B) provides for a mandatory minimum sentence for
violations involving lesser amounts of the same substances. 98 Fi-

person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows:
(1XA) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving.
(i) 1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of heroin;
(ii) 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing
a detectable amount of(I) coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca
leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives ecgonine or their salts have been removed;
(II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and
salts of isomers;
(III) ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts
of isomers; or
(IV) any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the substance referred to in
subclauses (I) through (III);
(iii) 50 grams or more of a mixture, or substance described in
clause (ii) which contains cocaine base;
(iv) 100 grams or more of phencyclidine (PCP) or 1 kilogram
or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of phencyclidine (PCP);
(v) 10 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD);
(vi) 400 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of N-phenyl-N-[-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinly]
propanamide or 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of any analogue of N-phenyl-N[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperdinyl] propanamide;
(vii) 1000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marihuana, or 1,000 or more
marihuana plants regardless of weight; or
(viii) 100 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers or 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers or salts of its isomers;
such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be
less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury results
from the use of such substance shall not be less than 20 years or more than
life ....

Id.
98

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1989) (as amended 1988). The statute provides:

[I]n the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving
(i) 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin;
(ii) 500 or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of(I) coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves
from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or
their salts have been removed;
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nally, section 841 provides for a mandatory prison term for relatively small. amounts of marihuana.9 9 Thus, narcotics defendants
are subject to mandatory sentences that will make plea bargaining
less appealing. Defendants facing a mandatory prison term will be
less likely to plea bargain and more likely to defend against the
charges in a full trial since the prosecutor's hands are tied.
(b) Domino-Effect is Possible in Weak and Strong Cases.-With
respect to non-narcotic cases, the domino-effect argument is equally flawed. The extent to which trial time is saved due to defendants observing strong cases for the prosecution is offset by the
increased trial time when the prosecution's case is weak. There is
certainly an equal possibility that severed defendants will choose

(II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts
of isomers;
(III) ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers; or
(IV) any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of any of the substance referred to in subclauses
(1) through (III);
(iii) 5 grams or more of a mixture, or substance described in clause (ii)
which contains cocaine base;
(iv) 10 grams or more of phencyclidine (PCP) or 1 kilogram or more
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP);
(v) 1 gram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD);
(vi) 40 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of N-phenyl-N-[-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinly] propanamide
or 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of any analogue of N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4piperdinyl] propanamide;
(vii) 100 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marihuana, or 1,000 or more marihuana plants regardless of weight; or
(viii) 10 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and
salts of its isomers or 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers
or salts of its isomers;
such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be
less than 5 years and not more than 40 years and if death or serious bodily
injury results from the use of such substance shall not be less than 20 years or
more than life ....
Id.
99 2i US.C. § 841(D) (1989) (as amended 1988). The section provides: "In the case
of less than 50 kilograms of marihuana . . . such person shall, excepi as provided in
paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection [dealing with minors], be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of not more than 5 years, a fine . . . or both." Id. (emphasis added).
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to go to trial after seeing the government's method and quality of
proof at another defendant's trial where the prosecution's case
was weak. Because such defendants have the added advantage of
seeing the prosecution's case, they may be more apt to go to trial
even if the government's case is not as weak, since they will know
what to expect and can tailor their defense accordingly. In short,
though severance may encourage some defendants to plea bargain
rather than litigate their charges, severance may also encourage
an equal or greater number of defendants to litigate their claims,
resulting in complex litigation.
B.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

The benchmarks pronounced by the Casamento court exceed
the bounds of judicial rulemaking authority. By demanding more
of the prosecution than the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
require, the court was engaged in judicial legislation. As the court
in United States v. Carper0 0 stated, courts must refrain from the
practice of judicial legislation in order to preserve the uniformity
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court called the
preservation of uniform federal criminal procedure a "major compulsion."' The court stated:
[U]niformity . ..

[is] a purpose which cannot be achieved or

adhered to when individual courts practice judicial legislation
in the face of a definite rule. It is such practice which adds to
the cynicism of those who believe that judgments of the courts
express nothing deeper than the personal preference of the
judge, and his opinions merely manipulate words and symbols
to rationalize or dissemble his predilections.'
By contradicting federal policy, the Second Circuit broke from the
current uniform practice of joining defendants and offenses
strictly according to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8 and
14.
1. Rule Making Power of the Judiciary
By adopting guidelines such as those issued by the Second
Circuit, courts are practicing judicial legislation in the face of

100
101
102
United
House

116 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1953).
Id. at 821.
Id. at 821-22 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the
States, Address at the American Bar Center Cornerstone Ceremony, International
Assembly Hall, Chicago, November 2, 1953).
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Rules 8 and 14. The guidelines give the trial judge power to sever
offenses or defendants where the Supreme Court has authorized,
through the Rules 8 and 14, prosecutors to join these offenses or
defendants.
(a) The History of Rules 8 and 14.-Congress gave the courts a
general power to establish rules for the judicial process' 03 and
specific powers to enact rules of criminal procedure. 10 4 28
U.S.C. § 2071 provides:
Rule-making power generally
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts
of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed
under section 2072 of this title.
(b) Any rule prescribed by a court, other than the Supreme
Court, under subsection (a) shall be prescribed only after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment .
(c) (2) Any ... rule prescribed by a court other than the Supreme Court under subsection (a) shall remain in effect unless
modified or abrogated by the Judicial Conference .... 105
(e) If the prescribing court determines that there is an immediate need for a rule, such court may proceed under this section
without public notice and opportunity for comment, but such

103 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
104 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982). This section was repealed by Act. Pub. L No. 100-102,
Tide IV, § 404(a), 102 Stat. 4651 (1988) (which appears as 28 U.S.C.S. § 2071 note).
Similar provisions now appear under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071 and 2074.
Section 3771 provided:
The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe,
from time to time, rules of pleading, practice, and procedure with respect to
All laws in conflict
any or all proceedings prior to and including verdict, ....
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (repealed 1988). In 1989, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071 and 2074 replaced 18
U.S.C. § 3771.
105 The Judicial Conference is the federal judiciary's principal policy-making body.
"Chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States, the Judicial Conference meets twice a
year and includes the chief judge from each appellate court, one district judge from
each regional circuit, and the chief judge of the Court of International Trade." J.
GEORGE, D. GOLASH & R. WHEELERY, HANDBOOK ON JURY USE IN THE FEDERAL DisTRIGT COURTS 5 (Federal Judicial Center 1989).
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court shall promptly thereafter afford such notice and opportunity for comment. t°6
Congress gave rule making power to the judicial branch because Congress concluded that the judicial branch was better
qualified to make such rules. As former Attorney General
Cummings stated:
Legislative bodies have neither the time to inquire objectively
into details of judicial procedure nor the opportunity to determine the necessity for amendment or change. Frequently, such
legislation has been enacted for the purpose of meeting particular problems or supposed difficulties, but results have usually
been confusing or otherwise unsatisfactory. Comprehensive
action has been lacking for obvious reason that the professional nature of the task would leave the legislature little time for
matter of substance and statesmanship. It often happened that
an admitted need for change, even in limited areas, could not
17
be secured.

106 28 U.S.G.S. § 2071 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
107 Cummings, The New Criminal Rules-Another Triumph of the Democratic Process, 31
A.B.A. J. 236 (1945). Cummings further explained:
The official initiative was, of course, taken by the Congress. After the enactment
of the necessary enabling legislation the Supreme Court proceeded through the
appointment of a committee of judges, lawyers, government officers, and teachers of law. But even that committee was, in effect, a conduit through which
judges, prosecutors, attorneys, government officials and others interested in the
functioning of criminal justice, throughout the length and breadth of the land,
could present their problems and make known their needs.
Id. at 236.
Cummings also related the history of the practice of rule making:
In the United States during the Nineteenth Century a powerful tendency developed to regulate court procedure by legislation. Impetus was given to this movement by the New York legislature in adopting in 1848, the Field Code of Civil
Procedure. This Code is a landmark in the history of procedural reform, for its
basic purpose was a simplified procedure since known as "code pleading." The
example thus set was followed by a large number of other states. The Field
Code, nevertheless, led to the unfortunate assumption that the proper approach
was through direct legislative action. As a result of amendments passed by the
legislature from year to year, the original Code became so burdened with detailed requirements that it practically broke down of its own weight ....
At
the close of 1938 . .. criminal procedure after verdict ...
was regulated by
non-legislative rules. Criminal procedure prior to verdict alone remained outside
the pale. The Attorney General in that year initiated the movement to extend
non-legislative rule making to the entire field of criminal law ....
Without a
single objection the Congress passed the [legislation] which became law on June
29, 1940, extending non-legislative rule making authority to the whole field of
federal criminal procedure.
Id. at 236-38.
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(b) Casamento Adds a Third Tier of Analysis.-Congress put
some limitations on courts making procedural rules. One specific
limitation requires that the rules "be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court."l 0' Guidelines for district court severance, such as
those found in Casamento, are inconsistent with Rules 8 and 14.
In accordance with Rules 8 and 14, prosecutors may join offenses
where the crimes are similar or arose out of the same transaction
and defendants who allegedly participated in the same act or
series, of acts so long as the defendant is not prejudiced. The
Casamento benchmarks require the prosecution to pass a third tier
of analysis even though the Rules 8 and 14 permit the joinder of
defendants or offenses.
Rule 8 supplies the first tier of analysis. With respect to joinder of offenses, Rule 8(a) requires the court to determine whether the offenses charged are "of the same or similar character or
are based on the same act or transaction. " ' °9 Similarly, with respect to joinder of defendants, Rule 8(b) requires the court to
determine whether the defendants "are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same 0series of acts or
transactions constituting an offense or offenses.""
Rule 14 supplies the second tier of analysis. Once a court has
determined that Rule 8 allows joinder of the defendants or offenses, the court must determine whether such joinder would
result in prejudice to either the defendant or the government. If
prejudice would occur, the court must sever the defendants or
offenses. In short, in a situation where Rules 8 and 14 have been
satisfied, the Supreme Court, through the rules it has enacted,
has determined that prosecutors may join defendants or offenses.
The Casamento guidelines add a third tier to the analysis by
requiring prosecutors to justify joinder beyond adhering to Rules
8 and 14. The Supreme Court did not intend the prosecution to
shoulder this added burden when it implemented those rules.
2.

Burden of Proof on Joinder Issue

The benchmarks clearly violate the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure with respect to the burden on the prosecution. When

108 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
109 FED. R. CRiM. P. 8(a). See supra note 57.
110 FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). See supra note 58.
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a trial is expected to exceed four months, the prosecutor is
obliged to present a "reasoned basis to support a conclusion that
a joint trial of all the defendants is more consistent with the fair
administration of justice than some manageable division of the
case into separate trials for groups of defendants.""1 This requirement places the burden on the prosecutor to show not only
that joinder is permitted under the rules of procedure but also
that joinder is the best approach. Such a burden was not contemplated by the Supreme Court when it laid down Rules 8 and 14.
In addition, if the trial is expected to take more than four
months and the number of defendants joined by the prosecution
is greater than ten, the guidelines make the burden even weightier. "The judge should oblige the prosecutor to make an especially
compelling justification.""'
When the prosecution has met its burden of proving the
"same transaction" under Rule 8, the burden to prove that the
defendants or offenses should not be joined shifts to the defense.
Under Rule 14, the defense must prove that the defendant would
be prejudiced by joinder. Under the Casamento benchmarks, the
burden shifts back to the prosecution to demonstrate, in some
cases in an especially compelling way, that the defendants or offenses should be joined. In short, the benchmarks create an additional burden and shift it from the defense to the prosecution,
when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly state that
the offenses or defendants may already be joined.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States
v. Rucker,"' concluded that Rule 14 placed the burden to prove
prejudice on the defendant, not on the prosecutor. The court
wrote:
The burden is upon the moving defendant to show facts demonstrating that he will be so severely prejudiced by a joint trial
that it would in effect deny him a fair trial. The defendant
must demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of the
joinder, not that he might have had a better chance for acquit4
tal at a separate trial1

In some jurisdictions, the burden on the defendant is higher than
a showing of simple prejudice. For example, the court in United

111
S. Ct.
112
113
114

United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1149, 1152 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
1138 (1990).
Id. (emphasis added).
i
586 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 902.
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States v. Escalantel5 wrote that "[r]ule 14 provides that, at the
discretion of the trial judge, a severance may be ordered when it
appears that a defendant may be significantly prejudiced by a joint
trial with his codefendants."" 6 Determining whether prejudice
exists, requiring severance under Rule 14, rests within the discretion of the trial judge." 7 As the court in United States v.
Neal"' stated, "[i]t is well settled that the grant or denial of a
severance under Rule 14 F.R.Crim. P., lies within the sound discretion of the trial court."" 9 The standard of review for a denial of severance is an abuse of discretion 20standard which requires
a finding of more than simple prejudice.

115 637 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), ceit. denied, ,449 U.S. 856 (1980).
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1058 (11th Cir. 1987), cet. denied, 486 U.S. 1025 (1988) ("To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the defendant must
establish that the joint trial subjected him not just to some prejudice, but to compelling
prejudice against which the district court could not afford protection); United States v.
Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983) (the "judge is empowered under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 to sever the trials of criminal defendants if he determines that the parties will be unduly prejudiced by a joint prosecution. That decision is
committed, however, to the broad discretion of the trial judge . . . ."); and United
States v. Olson, 504 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1974) ("even though counts are permissibly joined in the same indictment under Rule 8(a), if such joinder would create undue
prejudice to an accused during his trial, the Court has the discretion under Rule 14 to
order a prosecution election among counts or a severance of counts for trial").
118 692 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982).
119 Id. at 1305. The court continued. "For prejudice resulting from denial of a severance motion to justify reversal, the defendant must show more than just a better chance
of acquittal at separate trials." Id.
One circuit discussed a district court's power to sever without touching on prejudice. The court in United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 119 (9th Cir.), cet. denied, 435
U.S. 999 (1978), wrote:
Co-defendants jointly charged are, prima facie, to be jointly tried. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 8. The ordering of separate trials requires unusual circumstances and the
power to do so rests within the broad discretion of the DistriCt Court as an
aspect of its inherent right and duty to manage its own calendar.

See also United States v. Guterma, 181 F. Supp. 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (stating that courts
have power to sever defendants due to calendar considerations).
This standard may or may not require a finding of prejudice. Nonetheless, to the
extent that it does not, it makes Rules 8 and 14 superfluous because it gives trial judges
power to sever defendants when Rules 8 and 14 say they may .be joined.
120 See, e.g., United States v. Gorecki, 813 F.2d 40 (3d. Cir. 1987) ("A claim of improper joinder under F.R.Crim.P. 14 must demonstrate 'clear and substantial
prejudice'"); United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The defendant
must show a violation of one of his substantive rights, such as denial of the sixth
amendment right to confrontation, in order to make a showing of manifest prejudice");
United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir. 1987), cemi.denied, 486 U.S. 1025
(1988) ("To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the defendant must establish 'that the
joint trial subjected him not just to some prejudice, but to compelling prejudice against
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In sum, the trial judge has the discretion to determine whether prejudice exists, requiring severance of defendants or offenses
under Rule 14. This discretion generally applies to the finding of
prejudice, not the severance requirement. The Casamento court
gave courts discretion in determining whether to sever when the
court had already concluded that prejudice would not occur. This
discretion is beyond the court's power to create. The United
States Supreme Court determines the discretionary power of the
courts. By demanding more of the prosecution than the Supreme
Court demands, the Casamento holding requires courts to be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Casamento guidelines are thus invalid.
C.

Separation of Powers Forbids the Judiciary To Participatein
Charging Decisions

As stated earlier, the Casamento court wrote: "[T]he judge
should explore with the prosecutor whether the interests of justice
would be adequately served by limiting the prosecution of such
defendants to charges that can be proven expeditiously and that,
in the event of conviction, carry exposure to adequate maximum
12
penalties." '
The term "explore" is quite vague as used in this context. At the
very least, the court implied that in a case with several defendants
and/or offenses, the judge should have a role in determining
what the prosecution should charge. This role may be as minor as
suggesting charges or as significant as advising the prosecutor
what to charge. Since the latter role would more effectively
achieve the objectives of the Casamento benchmarks, the court
seems to be implying that the approach of advising the prosecutor what to charge is the one for courts to take.
In any event, this particular benchmark violates the separation of powers doctrine. Several United States Supreme Court
decisions have discussed the prosecutor's discretion with respect
to charging decisions. For example, the United States Supreme
Court, in United States v. Nixon, 122 held that "the Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide

which the district court could not afford protection"). See generally Criminal Procedure
Projec 1980-81 Term, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 578-80 (1981) (for discussion on the defendant's
burden of meeting the compelling prejudice standard).
121 Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151-52 (2d Cir. 1989), ceit.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138
(1990) (emphasis added). See supra note 50.
122 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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whether to prosecute a case."12 Also, the Court, in United States
2 4 stated that a "prosecutor should remain free bev. Goodwin,"
fore trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine'the extent of the societal interest in prosecution." 125 In
Newton v. Rumemy, 126 the Court explained: "[T]he reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions
are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and
intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities."
The most definitive statement from the United States Supreme Court was in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.121 In Bordenkircher,
the respondent, Hayes, was indicted for uttering a forged instrument. 128 During plea conferences, the prosecutor informed
Hayes that he would "return to the grand jury to seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act .. ,. which Would
have subjected Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of his two prior 'felony convictions."' 2 9 The
prosecutor did just that. After the Kentucky Court of Appeals
upheld Hayes' conviction under the recidivist statute, Hayes petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus.' The District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the writ, but the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court.'3 s The appellate court ordered Hayes to be discharged
2
after serving his sentence for uttering a forged instrument.'
The Supreme Court, however, held that the court of appeals
erred when it held that "the substance of the plea itself violated
the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Four-

123 Id.
124 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
125 Id. at 382.
126 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
127 434 U.S. 357 (1978), reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
128 Id. at 358.
129 Id. at 358.59. Hayes refused to plead guilty and the prosecutor obtained an
indictment as threatened. Id. at 359. The Court wrote:
It is not disputed that the recidivist charge was fully justified by the evidence,
that the prosecutor was in possession of this evidence at the time of the original indictment, and, that Hayes' refusal to plead guilty to the original charge
was what led to his indictment under the habitual criminal statute.

Id.
130 Id. at 360.
131 Id.
132 Bordenkirmher, 434 U.S. 357, 360, rehg denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
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teenth Amendment."' The Court reasoned: "In our system, so
long as the prosecutor has probable cause t6 believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before 4 the grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discre13
tion."
Of course the United States Constitution restrains the
prosecutor's discretion. The Court, in Oyler v. Boles,3 5 held that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits selective enforcement "based upon an unjustifiable standard
The
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."'
respect
to
with
Oyler decision involved prosecutorial discretion
which offenders to prosecute.
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
Batchelder,3 7 extended the reasoning in Oyler to the question of
prosecutorial discretion with respect to which offenses to charge. In
Batchelder, the respondent, who had a record as a convicted felon,
was charged with "receiving a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)."'1" On appeal, the court of appeals noted that the "substantive elements of
§ 922(h) and 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) are identical as applied to
a convicted felon who unlawfully receives a firearm. " '39 The former statute permitted the district court to sentence the respondent to five years' imprisonment whereas the latter allowed no
more than two years' imprisonment. 140 The Batchelder Court stated that "[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the
prosecutor's discretion."141 The Court held that the exception to
this general rule is when prosecutors violate the United States

133
134

Id. at 362.
Id. at 364. The Court continued:

Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of
chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is
not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was
[not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification."
Id. (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
135 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
136 Id at 465.
137 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
138 Id. at 116.
139 Id. at 116-17.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 124.
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Constitution in exercising their discretion. Citing the Olyer equal
protection analysis, the Court stated that prosecutors may not selectively enforce criminal laws "based on an unjustifiable
standard
14 2
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."
In short, the Court recognized broad discretion on the part
of prosecutors with respect to charging decisions, including what
offenses to charge. Nonetheless, this discretion is not unfettered
because the equal protection clause prohibits prosecutors from
making arbitrary decisions based on unjustifiable standards.
The Ninth Circuit has prohibited a district court from effectively assuming the role of "exploring" the charges with the prosecutor. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Carrasco,4 s held that
"[c]harging decisions are generally within the prosecutor's exclusive domain .... Because the separation of powers mandates
judicial respect for the prosecutor's independence,... an indictment will be dismissed only in flagrant cases of prosecutorial
misconduct."14 4 In Carrasco, the defendants "pled guilty to count
145
one of the indictment and prepared for trial on count two."
The district court subsequently dismissed the second count sua
sponte 146 because the judge believed "he could impose an appropriate sentence based on count one alone and, accordingly,
that nothing would be gained by going to trial on count
two." 47 The Ninth Circuit held that the dismissal was error because "it
improperly intruded upon the prosecutor's discretion."148 The court stated:
[The interests which would allow the court to make such a
decision 49 are not] implicated when an indictment is dismissed ... merely because the court considers it unnecessary
in determining the appropriate sentence. The district court
may well have concluded that the sentence would be the same
whether or not defendants were convicted on count two; nevertheless, it is the prosecutor, not the coirt, who has primary
responsibility for determining which violations of the law will

142 Batcheder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979).
143
144
145
146
147
148

786 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1986).
I& at 1455.
Id. at 1453.
Id.
Carasco, 786 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id.

149

The court listed preservation of judicial integrity, fairness to the defendant, deter-

rence of prosecutorial misconduct, and prevention of constitutional violations as interests

which made a dismissal such as the one in Carmsco"appropriate. I&.
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be prosecuted.1' 5
In short, the court held that "[a]bsent a constitutional violation or some form of misconduct justifying an exercise of its supervisory powers, a court errs when it interferes with decisions
which are properly within the domain of the prosecutor."' 51 The
Casamento court advocated just this type of interference.
V.

CONCLUSION

The criminal mega-trial creates many problems for the courts.
Nonetheless, a solution that violates longstanding policies of the
Supreme Court, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
doctrine of separation of powers is not the answer to these problems. Unless the Supreme Court adopts a new policy, perhaps by
amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Casamento
solution, though quick and easy, is short-sighted and improper.
BrendanJudge

150
151

Id at 1456.
Id.

